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Environmental Policy Instruments: Technology Adoption
Incentives with Imperfect Compliance
Abstract
We study the incentives to adopt advanced abatement technologies in the presence
of imperfect compliance. Interestingly, incentives under emission taxes and pollution
abatement subsidies are the same that in the perfect compliance scenario. However, under
emission standards imperfect compliance can increase firms’ incentives to invest, whereas
under an emission permit mechanism investment incentives decrease only if widespread
non-compliance induces a reduction in the permit price. Our results are valid for fairly
general characteristics of the monitoring and enforcement strategies commonly found in
both, theoretical and empirical applications.
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1 Introduction
The performance of environmental policy instruments under imperfect compliance has been an-
alyzed, among others, in Downing andWatson [1974], Harford [1978], Jones [1989], Malik [1990],
Keeler [1991], Stranlund and Dhanda [1999], Montero [2002], Sadmo [2002], Macho-Stadler and
Perez-Castrillo [2006], Stranlund [2007], Arguedas [2008] and Rousseau and Proost [2009].1
All these studies evaluate the static eﬃciency properties of marketable emission permits, pol-
lution taxes, abatement subsidies and/or pollution standards under diﬀerent alternatives of
the monitoring and sanctioning policies. Generally, they examine firms’ incentives to abate
pollution under given policy instruments with the possibility of non-compliance, and/or they
determine optimal policies under imperfect compliance. However, none of these studies inves-
tigate the dynamic properties of these instruments with imperfect compliance, that is, firms’
incentives to adopt new environmental abatement technologies. Nevertheless, questions about
adoption incentives might be particularly relevant in environmental programs with significant
non-compliance, as shown, for example, in the studies by Montero et al. [2002] on the emissions
trading program for total suspended particles in Santiago, Chile, and by Harrington [2003] on
the EPA’s National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Program of the Clean Water Act.
By contrast, the issue of the adoption incentives under the diﬀerent environmental policy
instruments (i.e., dynamic eﬃciency), has been deeply studied in the case of perfect compliance.
In general, the ranking of optimal policy instruments when promoting the investment in cleaner
technologies depends on the structure of the regulation schemes, such as the timing of the game
(or behavior of the regulator), the output market (im)perfect competition, the damage function,
1See also Macho-Stadler [2008] for a recent overview of this literature.
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etc.2
In this paper we link both literature strands by analyzing technology adoption incentives
in the presence of imperfect compliance, and we compare our results with those already ob-
tained under perfect compliance. We show that imperfect compliance does not alter adoption
incentives in the case of either taxes or subsidies. However, investment incentives decrease
under emission permits only if the market permit price is reduced as a result of significant
non-compliance, whereas firms’ investment incentives can increase under pollution standards.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We present the basic model and analyze
adoption incentives in the case of emission permits in section 2. In section 3 we consider
pollution taxes and abatement subsidies, while in section 4 we study pollution standards. We
conclude in Section 5.
2 Tradable Emission Permits
Consider an industry with n firms (with n large) that emit an homogeneous pollutant. Firms
are indexed by i and the pollution discharge of firm i ∈ n is denoted by ei ∈ [0, emaxi ]. In
the absence of regulation firm i pollutes emaxi > 0. However, firm i can abate pollution by
using its installed conventional pollution abatement technology, or by adopting a new advanced
abatement technology at a fixed cost Ii.3 The abatement technology of firm i is characterized by
2See, for example, Requate and Unold [2001, 2003] and Requate [2005] for a recent survey of the diﬀerent
ranking analyses established in the literature.
3The assumption of an exogenously fixed investment cost in a newer less polluting process is standard in
the technology adoption literature, while there is a specific literature that studies the incentives to innovate in
cleaner technologies undertaking research and development activities, therefore determining endogenously the
cost of the new technologies. This is normally accomplished by considering alternative competitive structures
3
the abatement costs function cki (ei), where k = {0, 1} stands for the conventional and the new
(cleaner) technology, respectively. Therefore, the pairwise abatement costs comparison satisfies
the usual assumptions c0i (ei) > c
1
i (ei) > 0 and −c0￿i (ei) > −c1￿i (ei) ≥ 0 for all ei ∈ [0, emaxi ),
while limei→0 c
k￿
i (ei) = −∞, c0￿i (emaxi ) = 0, and ck￿￿i (ei) > 0 for all ei ∈ [0, emaxi ].
We assume that the regulator sets an aggregate emission target E¯ and then issues a number
S ≤ E¯ of tradable permits, where p denotes the corresponding competitive permit market price
and si ≥ 0 the number of permits hold by firm i. For simplicity, we assume that initially the
regulator allocates si ≥ 0 permits to firm i, such that
￿
i
si =
￿
i
si = S.4
Within this framework, a compliant firm pollutes no more than its permit holding, that is,
ei ≤ si, whereas a non-compliant firm pollutes more than its permit holding and, therefore, the
firm’s violation amount is defined as vi = ei − si > 0.
The regulator observes the number of permits held by each firm and uses a monitoring
strategy characterized by an inspection probability πi (vi) ∈ [0, 1], which (weakly) depends on
the violation size and satisfies the usual properties πi (0) > 0, π￿i (vi) ≥ 0 and π￿￿i (vi) ≥ 0. If
firm i is inspected and found to be non-compliant, i.e., vi > 0, then it is charged a monetary
sanction, fi (vi), where fi (0) = 0, f ￿i (vi) > 0 and f
￿￿
i (vi) ≥ 0.5
(perfect or imperfect) in the output market (see, for example, Innes and Bial [2002] or Parry [1995, 1998]).
Nevertheless, as Requate [2005] has pointed out, this terminological distinction is not always sharp in the
literature, since Downing and White [1986] talk about innovation, whereas Milliman and Prince [1989] use the
notion of technical change, although the real subject of both studies is the incentive for adopting a (cleaner)
existing technology.
4The choice of the initial permit allocation mechanism (being them grandfathered or auctioned) does not
aﬀect our results, as in the perfect compliance case. See proposition 2 in Requate and Unold [2001].
5Note that we allow both the inspection probability and the fine to depend on the size of the violation and
also to vary across firms. These assumptions are in line with the existing theoretical literature and consistent
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Within this regulatory framework, each firm i decides on (a) the amount of pollution ei, (b)
the permit holding si, and (c) whether or not to invest in the advanced abatement technology.6
Then, a risk-neutral firm i solves the following optimization problem:
min
c0i ,c
1
i

minei,si c
0
i (ei) + p [si − si] + πi (vi) fi (vi) ;
minei,si c
1
i (ei) + p [si − si] + πi (vi) fi (vi) + Ii
 ,
s.t. ei ≥ si. (1)
Given the optimal levels
￿
eki , s
k
i , v
k
i
￿
for each abatement technology k = {0, 1}, the firm
decides whether to invest in the new technology by evaluating which option results in lower
minimum expected costs.7
2.1 Firm’s Compliance Decision
Once the investment decision is made, for a given technology k = {0, 1} , the firm solves the
following problem:
min
ei,si
cki (ei) + p [si − si] + πi (vi) fi (vi)
s.t. vi ≥ 0; si ≥ 0. (2)
with the empirical evidence. For example, in a study about the structure of the penalties for water quality
violations in Georgia, Olhaca et al. [1998] find that the extent of the violation, past compliance records and the
size of the company strongly influence penalty levels. Among others, Rousseau and Proost [2005] and Shavell
[1992] have defended, respectively, inspection probabilities and fines dependent on the degree of non-compliance.
6That is, whether to operate with abatement costs c1i (ei) or c0i (ei).
7Note that a compliant firm has no incentive to choose an emission level (strictly) lower than its permit
holding, i.e. ei < si, since in that case the firm faces higher abatement costs with no additional revenue.
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The lagrangian of problem (2) is the following:
L = cki (ei) + p [si − si] + πi (vi) fi (vi)− µvi − λsi,
where µ ≥ 0 and λ ≥ 0 are the respective Kuhn-Tucker multipliers associated with the in-
equality restrictions in problem (2). The necessary and suﬃcient conditions for an optimum
are:8
ck￿i (ei) + π
￿
i (vi) fi (vi) + πi (vi) f
￿
i (vi)− µ = 0; (3)
p− π￿i (vi) fi (vi)− πi (vi) f ￿i (vi) + µ− λ = 0; (4)
µvi = 0; µ ≥ 0; vi ≥ 0; (5)
λsi = 0; λ ≥ 0; si ≥ 0. (6)
Assuming a positive permit holding (i.e., ski ≥ 0 and λ = 0), and adding up conditions (3)
and (4), we obtain:
ck￿i
￿
eki
￿
+ p = 0, (7)
that is, for a given permit price, the optimal pollution decision is independent of the monitoring
strategy.
Now, combining conditions (4) and (5), we have compliance (eki = s
k
i ) if and only if µ =
πi (0) f ￿i (0)−p ≥ 0, that is, whenever the marginal penalty of an infinitesimal violation exceeds
the permit price. Otherwise, we have non-compliance (eki > s
k
i ) with the optimal violation level
8This is so because our assumptions ensure that the objective function in equation (2) is strictly convex and
the inequality constraints are linear. Our model assumptions also ensure that the selected pollution level is
strictly positive.
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given by:
p = π￿i
￿
vki
￿
fi
￿
vki
￿
+ πi
￿
vki
￿
f ￿i
￿
vki
￿
, (8)
that is, the cost of buying an additional permit must equal the marginal penalty savings.
Interestingly, the amount of the violation for each firm is independent of the choice of technology,
that is, v0i = v
1
i .
These results are well-known in the literature on emission trading with imperfect compli-
ance.9 Under a tradable permit mechanism with perfect competition, firms’ positive amounts
of permit holdings and plausible assumptions on the monitoring and enforcement strategies,
(a) the incentives to pollute do not change under imperfect compliance −unless extended non-
compliance induces a reduction in the permit price; and (b) firms’ compliance decisions are
crucially aﬀected by the monitoring and enforcement strategies applied to them, but they are
independent on their specific technological characteristics.
We illustrate in figure 1 the pollution and permit demand decisions of a single firm as
functions of the permit price. In the horizontal axis we measure both the pollution level and
the permit demand, while the permit price is represented in the vertical axis. The pollution
decision negatively depends on the price since, by condition (7), ek￿i (p) = − 1ck￿￿i (eki ) , where
ck￿￿i (ei) > 0. The permit demand is also decreasing in the price, since, combining (7) and (8),
we have:
sk￿i (p) = −
1 +
￿
π￿￿i
￿
vki
￿
f ￿i
￿
vki
￿
+ π￿i
￿
vki
￿
f ￿￿i
￿
vki
￿￿
1
ck
￿￿
i (eki )
π￿￿i
￿
vki
￿
f ￿i
￿
vki
￿
+ π￿i
￿
vki
￿
f ￿￿i
￿
vki
￿ < 0. (9)
Since π￿￿i
￿
vki
￿
f ￿i
￿
vki
￿
+ π￿i
￿
vki
￿
f ￿￿i
￿
vki
￿
> 0, it is easy to see that the slope of the permit
9See, among others, Malik [1990], Keeler [1991], Stranlund and Dhanda [1999] and Stranlund [2007]. Also,
these results have been recently tested experimentally, see Murphy and Stranlund [2006].
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demand function is larger (in absolute terms) than that of the pollution decision function. This
means that the violation size is increasing in the permit price.10
Figure 1: Firm’s Pollution Decision and Permit Demand
2.2 Firm’s Investment Decision
To our best knowledge, the literature has not investigated the technology adoption incentives
under imperfect compliance. We now analyze whether firm i has incentives to invest in the
advanced abatement technology k = 1. Let:
Cki = c
k
i
￿
eki
￿
+ p
￿
ski − si
￿
+ πi
￿
vki
￿
fi
￿
vki
￿
, (10)
10In figure 1 we implicitly assume that πi (0) f ￿i (0) = 0. However, if πi (0) f ￿i (0) > 0, then eki (p) and ski (p)
would be the same for p ≤ πi (0) f ￿i (0) . Nevertheless, our results do not hinge upon this assumption.
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be the minimum expected costs of firm i associated with technology k, where
￿
eki , s
k
i , v
k
i
￿
are the
corresponding optimal pollution, permit holding and degree of violation decisions, respectively.
Firm i invests in the new technology if and only if the associated expected cost savings of
investing outweigh the investment costs, i.e., ∆Ci = C0i − C1i ≥ Ii.
From (10), we then have
∆Ci = c
0
i
￿
e0i
￿− c1i ￿e1i ￿+ p ￿s0i − s1i ￿+ πi ￿v0i ￿ fi ￿v0i ￿− πi ￿v1i ￿ fi ￿v1i ￿ . (11)
We consider first the case of perfect compliance, i.e. πi (0) f ￿i (0) ≥ p. Note that this
situation induces full compliance regardless of the technology choice, that is, v0i = v
1
i = 0.
Therefore, equation (11) can be rewritten as:
∆Ci = c
0
i
￿
e0i
￿− c1i ￿e1i ￿+ p ￿e0i − e1i ￿ , (12)
which is the well-known expression for the cost savings found, for example, in Requate and
Unold [2001, 2003], or Requate [2005].
Now in case of imperfect compliance, where πi(0)f ￿i(0) < p, for any individual firm the
amount of the violation is independent of the technology as shown in equation (8). That is:
v0i = v
1
i , for all i. (13)
Hence, firm i’s expected penalties do not depend on the technology choice either, that is:
πi
￿
v0i
￿
fi
￿
v0i
￿
= πi
￿
v1i
￿
fi
￿
v1i
￿
. (14)
Therefore, equation (11) trivially reduces to:
∆Ci = c
0
i
￿
e0i
￿− c1i ￿e1i ￿+ p ￿s0i − s1i ￿ .
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Again applying condition (13), we have s0i − s1i = e0i − e1i , and therefore:
∆Ci = c
0
i
￿
e0i
￿− c1i ￿e1i ￿+ p ￿e0i − e1i ￿ , (15)
which is exactly equal to the cost savings under perfect compliance, as in equation (12).
As a result, besides abatement and investments costs, i.e., technological characteristics,
the only relevant variable in each firm’s investment decision is the market permit price, and
not whether the monitoring policy induces compliance or non-compliance. For a given permit
price, the expected cost savings associated with the technology adoption only depend on the
optimal pollution level, and the latter is independent of the monitoring strategy, as established
in equation (7). The investment decision is thus independent of the monitoring strategy. That
is, for a given permit price, firms that find it profitable to adopt the advanced abatement
technology under perfect compliance will also adopt it under imperfect compliance, and vice
versa.
Therefore, changes in both the pollution level and the investment decision can only be due
to changes in the permit price, which is determined endogenously. It is easy to see that the
permit price decreases as a result of non-compliance. This is due to the fact that the demand
for permits is: (i) lower than the pollution level, and (ii) decreasing in price, see equation(9)
and figure 1. As a result, for a fixed permit supply S, a lower aggregate demand for permits
decreases their price. Clearly, the decrease in the price will be larger the more extended non-
compliance is within the industry. From expressions (7) and (15) this results in more pollution
and less investment than in the full compliance case. The result regarding adoption incentives
is summarized in the following:
Proposition 1: For a given supply of tradable permits, imperfect compliance causes a re-
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duction of the market permit price that decreases adoption incentives when compared to perfect
compliance.
Finally, an appealing implication of our study emerges. Assume two alternative scenarios,
one inducing perfect compliance (where S = E¯) and another one inducing imperfect compliance
(S < E¯), such that both lead to the same market permit price. These two alternative scenarios
are illustrated in figure 2. In the perfect compliance case the market demand for permits is
given by the aggregate pollution level,
￿
eki (p), while permits supply is E¯, yielding a clearing
price of p. In the imperfect compliance case permits’ demand and supply are respectively given
by
￿
ski (p) and S, resulting in the same clearing price.
Our finding is that industry adoption incentives remain the same. Therefore, besides specific
firm characteristics, the only relevant variable in the adoption decision is the permit price. This
is summarized in:
Proposition 2: Under emission permits, the incentives to adopt only depend on the firms’
technological characteristics and the permit price. If two alternative monitoring policies, one
inducing compliance and another one inducing non-compliance, lead to the same market price,
adoption incentives are equal.
3 Pollution Taxes and Abatement Subsidies
After having analyzed emission permits, we check how our results change under the alternative
systems of pollution taxes and abatement subsidies.
Assume now that the regulator imposes a tax per unit of pollution, τ > 0. In order to
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Figure 2: Compliance scenarios resulting in the same permit price
introduce the possibility of non-compliance in this context, we assume that the firm reports the
pollution level to the regulator and pays taxes according to the reported level. Let ri be the
amount of pollution reported. The firm complies with the regulation if it reports the amount
of pollution emitted (ri = ei), while it does not comply with the regulation if it reports a lower
level than emitted, i.e. ri < ei. Thus, let vi = ei − ri be the amount of the violation. Now, the
firm decides on (a) the amount of pollution ei, (b) the reported level ri, and (c) whether or not
to invest in the advanced abatement technology. The optimization problem is now:
min
c0i ,c
1
i

minei,ri c
0
i (ei) + τri + πi (vi) fi (vi) ;
minei,ri c
1
i (ei) + τri + πi (vi) fi (vi) + Ii
 ,
s.t. ei ≥ ri.
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It is straightforward to see that equations (7), (8) and (15) are simply obtained by inter-
changing p for τ . The only diﬀerence with the emission permit mechanism is that the pollution
tax is exogenously given while the market clearing permit price is endogenously determined. As
a result, the presence of imperfect compliance in this case only results in tax evasion (i.e., the
possibility of under-reporting and paying less taxes), but it does not alter either the pollution
levels or the technology adoption incentives.
The case of a subsidy per unit of abated pollution (σ > 0), with the possibility of re-
porting more abatement (or less pollution) than the actual level (i.e., ri ≤ ei) is trivially
obtained by simply substituting the tax τri by the subsidy −σ (emaxi − ri) in the above objec-
tive function, and p by σ in equations (7), (8) and (15). Therefore, the same results concerning
pollution levels and adoption incentives with abatement subsidies under imperfect compliance
are obtained. The only diﬀerence now is that the presence of imperfect compliance results in
over-subsidization.
4 Pollution Standards
Finally, we consider how technology adoption incentives change under a system of pollution
limits or standards. Let ei > 0 be the pollution limit required for firm i. In this context,
compliant firms select a pollution level of ei ≤ ei, while non-compliant firms exceed the pollution
level, i.e. ei > ei. Therefore, the degree of the violation is now defined as vi = ei−ei ≥ 0, which
is detected only through monitoring.
Then, for a given standard ei, the firm decides on (a) the pollution level ei and (b) whether
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or not to invest in the advanced abatement technology. The optimization problem is now:
min
c0i ,c
1
i

minei c
0
i (ei) + πi (vi) fi (vi) ;
minei c
1
i (ei) + πi (vi) fi (vi) + Ii
 ,
s.t. ei ≥ ei.
Following a similar procedure to that of the previous sections, and for a given technology
k, firm i complies with the standard as long as πi(0)f ￿i(0) ≥ −ck￿i (ei), that is, as long as the
marginal expected penalty of exceeding the first unit is larger than the abatement cost savings.
In that case, we have eki = ei, and then the firm decides to adopt the new technology if and
only if the cost savings of adopting outweigh the investment costs, that is, if and only if:
∆Ci = c
0
i (ei)− c1i (ei) ≥ Ii.
However, technology adoption incentives change ambiguously under imperfect compliance.
Assume first that firm i is confronted with the same standard ei, but now the expected penalty
for non-compliance is such that −c0￿i (ei) > πi(0)f ￿i(0) ≥ −c1￿i (ei). This means that the firm
exceeds the standard under the conventional technology, but it complies with the standard
under the new technology, i.e., v1i = 0. Now, the cost savings of adopting are:
∆Ci = c
0
i
￿
e0i
￿
+ πi
￿
v0i
￿
fi
￿
v0i
￿− c1i (ei) ,
where e0i > ei is the optimal non-compliance decision under the conventional technology, given
by c0￿i (e
0
i ) + π
￿
i(v
0
i )fi(v
0
i ) + πi(v
0
i )f
￿
i(v
0
i ) = 0. Clearly, c
0
i (e
0
i ) + πi(v
0
i )fi(v
0
i ) < c
0
i (ei) (since e
0
i is
the optimal decision, while ei belongs to the choice set) and, therefore, adoption incentives
decrease with respect to the situation of perfect compliance. As a consequence, given a fixed
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pollution standard, the induced pollution level increases and the incentive to adopt decreases
under imperfect compliance, as compared to the situation of perfect compliance.
However, consider now a second possibility of designing an imperfect monitoring policy
which induces the same pollution level as that observed under perfect compliance. This can
be illustrated at hand of figure 3. The pollution standard under this alternative policy is
ei < ei, and the expected fine is such that the induced pollution level under the conventional
technology is e0i = ei. With perfect compliance, producing with the convectional technology
carries abatements costs equal to A, while if there is imperfect compliance costs increase by
the expected fine B. Adopting the new technology results in cost savings equal to A in case
of perfect compliance, and A+B when imperfect compliance is observed. Therefore, adoption
incentives are increased as a result of imperfect compliance, as stated in:
Figure 3: Pollution Standards
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Proposition 3: Under an emission standard, imperfect compliance increases adoption in-
centives when compared to perfect compliance, if both monitoring policies induce the same pol-
lution level.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we have analyzed the firms’ incentives to invest in advanced abatement tech-
nologies under imperfect compliance comparing this scenario to the case of perfect monitoring.
With regard to tradable permits, we have shown that adoption incentives in emission permit
programs do not change, unless extended non-compliance causes a reduction in the permit
price. Therefore, changes in adoption incentives are only due to the fact that the permit price
is endogenously determined and could decrease as a consequence of a significant reduction in
the permit demand. Under the alternative system of exogenous pollution taxes or abatement
subsidies with the possibility of under-reporting, the pollution levels as well as the investment
decisions by the firms would not change. Imperfect compliance in these alternative contexts
would only cause either tax evasion or over-subsidization. Finally, the response regarding pol-
lution standards is ambiguous, as firm’s adoption decision depends on the alternative imperfect
monitoring policies that the regulator may implement. If both, the perfect and imperfect
compliance policies, consider the same pollution standard, adoption incentives are lower un-
der imperfect compliance. However, if both policies induce the same pollution level under the
conventional technology, then adoption incentives with imperfect compliance increase when
compared to the perfect compliance scenario.
Our results contribute to relate two large strands of literature by setting up the framework
16
to bridge the gap between them. The first one studies policy instruments under perfect and
imperfect compliance but neglects technology adoption (static setting), while the second one
studies policy adoption incentives in a dynamic setting under alterative policy instruments,
but neglects the monitoring strategy of the regulator. With respect to the former, unresolved
issues have to do with the welfare implications of allowing tax evasion (or over-subsidization)
in dynamic settings that consider technology adoption. With respect to the latter, while we
do not intend to provide a ranking of optimal policy instruments, our results under imperfect
compliance are quite robust as they would hold regardless of particular specific designs charac-
terizing the structure of the regulation policy, including the timing of the game, the behavior
of the regulator, or features of the damage functions.
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